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Abstract Both deterrence theory and deterrence practice are evolving to address
contemporary strategic challenges. In the military domain, states progressively
integrate and synchronise military operations. Outside of it, they exploit grey zone
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strategies that combine different instruments of influence across multiple domains.
These developments are now giving birth to a new wave of thinking about cross
domain deterrence (CDD), what it precisely entails, and what favouring conditions
are necessary for it to be effective. This chapter situates CDD in the context of
today’s challenges, and identifies the prerequisites for these favouring conditions
based on a review of a rather diverse body of literature. It finds that one strand of
that literature predominantly focuses on practical and technical prerequisites in
order for CDD to be effective, leaving the framework of traditional deterrence
theory intact. It also finds a second strand that holds that the nature of today’s
challenges requires more than mere innovation in application. The ideas about
deterrence proposed by this second strand are expanding on common understand-
ings of deterrence to the extent that deterrence is no longer only about fear nor
about convincing opponents to refrain from certain behaviour. The conclusion
summarises the findings and elaborates their implications for theory and practice.
Keywords deterrence  dissuasion  cross domain  cyberspace  space  grey
zone  hybrid threats
8.1 Introduction
Deterrence is about convincing adversaries to refrain from certain behaviour
through the prospect of costs that outweigh the benefits.1 As related in the preface
to this volume by Osinga and Sweijs, deterrence has been a central tenet of strategic
practice throughout history,2 even if its logic was only clearly articulated in the
aftermath of the Second World War. Deterrence scholarship has since then evolved
in four consecutive waves. The first, second and third wave of the deterrence
literature, which emerged during the Cold War, tended to almost exclusively focus
on deterrence of high-intensity aggression including most importantly the possible
use of nuclear weapons alongside large scale conventional invasion.3
Lower-intensity threats which were considered mere nuisances were largely left
outside of the scope of investigation.4 However, these became more important in
the 1990s with the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of non-traditional
threats such as terrorism.5 This gave birth to the fourth wave of deterrence literature
that focused on the question whether deterrence would work against such threats
that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s.6 Over the past decade, a new body of ideas
has been emerging concerning the application of deterrence in today’s strategic
1Long 2008, pp. 7–8. See also the preface by Osinga and Sweijs in the present volume.
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environment. An important characteristic of our age is the proliferation of ways and
means by which hostile activities can be perpetrated. Accordingly, strategists have
started to pay more attention to the application of deterrence in new domains and to
cross domain deterrence (CDD), across both traditional and new domains. This
chapter appraises the contribution of the emerging body of cross domain deterrence
literature to deterrence theory and deterrence practice. It explains the context in
which theories of cross domain deterrence have emerged and elaborates different
conceptualisations of cross domain deterrence distinguishing between two different
approaches. The conclusion summarises the findings and elaborates their implica-
tions for theory and practice.7
8.2 The Origins of Cross-Domain Deterrence
The shift in attention to CDD can be explained by two principal challenges. The
first challenge relates to the progressive integration and synchronization of military
operations across different domains (land, air, sea, cyber, and space) and the
inherent disharmony between different levels of war (strategic, operational and
tactical).8 This is because military organizations aspire to better integrate physical,
social and communication technologies in their ability to apply violence in the
pursuit of political objectives, leading to strategic compression and cross domain
warfare. Multi-domain operations concepts are being developed to guide efforts to
synchronise actions both horizontally across domains and vertically across levels of
war.9 In light of the cross-domain nature of the challenge, strategists are envisaging
analogous responses, including CDD.
The second challenge relates to the increased salience of “hybrid” or “grey zone”
strategies that feature the simultaneous employment of military and non-military
instruments, typically below the conventional military threshold, in an ambiguous
fashion in order to evade attribution, with the goal to exploit adversary’s vulner-
abilities, in the pursuit of political objectives.10 While the analytical value of the
labels as such have caused considerable debate,11 the real-world impact of these
strategies poses a serious strategic challenge. Their increased salience stems from
the enormous costs associated with interstate wars, which makes major military
powers disinclined from waging actual hot wars against each other. These powers
therefore try and find alternative ways to achieve their political objectives—in line
7This chapter builds on and further develops ideas that we first discussed in Sweijs and Zilincik
2019.
8Luttwak 2002.
9This is an evolutionary change, which has been long time in coming, and builds on earlier
historical military strategic concepts such as Combined Arms Warfare, Joint Warfare, and Network
Centric Warfare. See Black 2018; Johnson 2018; Hayes and Alberts 2003.
10Fridman 2018, p. 154; Morris et al. 2019, pp. 7–12; Hoffman 2018.
11See for example Stoker and Whiteside 2020.
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with the original tenets of the coercive diplomacy literature. Furthermore, the
increased salience of grey zone strategies also derives from the opportunities
offered by new avenues to hurt opponents due to technological and societal
developments because of the global wiring of societies over the past quarter cen-
tury. Strategically innovative actors have been making frequent use of these ave-
nues over the past decade to considerable effect. These developments have led
scholars and strategists to start thinking about the use and utility of cross domain
deterrence in dealing with adversaries employing cross domain strategies also
outside the traditional military domains.
Authors from both sides of the Atlantic generally concur that cross-domain
deterrence involves the use of threats in one domain to deter activities in (an)other
domain(s). Some authors define cross domain deterrence exclusively in the military
domains land, sea, air, cyber and space albeit at different levels of abstraction.
James Scouras, Edward Smyth and Thomas Mahnken assert for example that it is
the prospect of retaliation from one domain to another which constitutes the essence
of CDD.12 It is worth noting that the authors seem to focus exclusively on deter-
rence by punishment rather than denial. James Dawkins emphasizes that CDD
involves the use of specific weapons rather than mere threats or retaliation in
general. His conceptualization includes both punishment and denial strategies and
draws attention to the actual instruments by which deterrent effects are to be
achieved.13 Despite the differences in abstraction, these authors understand CDD to
operate specifically within the military domains.
Other authors also consider non-military domains and instruments. Accordingly,
Manzo Vince understands CDD to refer to deterrent efforts on land, at sea, in the
air, in space, in cyberspace and through economic sanctions as well as other
non-violent instruments.14 King Mallory, too, includes both non-military instru-
ments and non-military domains, arguing that CDD is about preventing escalation
in any domain and across them.15 Sean Monaghan, Patrick Cullen and Njord
Wegge assert that contemporary deterrence strategies should include an array of
non-military means to detect, deter and respond in a tailored way.16 More generi-
cally, Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay conceive of CDD as “the use of threats of
one type, or some combination of different types, to dissuade a target from taking
actions of another type to attempt to change the status quo”.17
12Scouras et al. 2017.
13Dawkins 2009, p. 12.
14Vince 2015, p. 3.
15Mallory 2018, pp. 7–12. Vertical escalation, in the crisis escalation management literature, refers
to escalating the intensity of force within one specific domain. Horizontal escalation refers to the
expansion of escalation in other geographical domains, but can also describe escalation to
non-traditional domains. For the original work, see Kahn 1965. For more recent elaborations on
the concepts, see Morgan et al. 2008; Sweijs et al. 2016.
16Cullen and Wegge 2019.
17Lindsay and Gartzke 2019a, p. 4.
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8.3 The CDD Literature: Practical Innovation Versus
Theoretical Reconceptualisation
8.3.1 Innovation in Practical Application
Over the past decade or so, two approaches to CDD have emerged. The first
approach emphasises that CDD requires merely the extension and refinement of the
practical application of general deterrence theory. Authors within this approach
argue that deterrence has always been cross domain in nature, albeit only in the
context of traditional military domains.18 Despite the emergence of new domains,
deterrence in today’s world is as such not different, so they argue.19 Accordingly,
Christopher Buckley asserts that cross domain deterrence has been practiced in the
West for a very long time simply because “deterrence policy and strategy are
concepts too big to be constrained in a single domain.”20 Still, it is acknowledged
that particular aspects of deterrence in practice are in need of refinement. Gartzke
and Lindsay, for example, observe that the “increasing complexity in the entire
portfolio of means now available now appears to necessitate the refinement of
deterrence as both a military and political process.”21 But what does refinement
precisely entail for CDD to be effective? The authors in the refinement camp tend to
focus on practical problems associated with the necessary conditions for effective
CDD. Important requirements of deterrence in general that they focus on include
attribution, threat credibility and proportionality, signalling and escalation man-
agement.22 Attribution depends on the ability and the willingness to ascribe
responsibility for a particular act to an actor. Without the possibility of attribution,
transgressors can act undetected and therefore escape allocation of blame.
Credibility is rooted in the perceived capability and willingness to act. It is crucial
for deterrence to work because adversaries have to believe they will suffer negative
consequences for their wrongdoings. Threats that are not credible are irrelevant for
deterrence purposes. In general, threats which are proportional to their triggers are
likely to be perceived more credible than disproportionate ones. Signalling refers to
the process of communicating one’s willingness and capabilities to act to instil that
belief in the adversary. Attribution, credibility, threat proportionality and signalling
together are prerequisites for escalation management, which is the regulation of the
18Mallory 2018, p. 6.
19Denning 2015.
20Buckley 2018.
21Lindsay and Gartzke 2016, p. 24. The quote is taken from the original draft of the chapter but it
did not make it into the final version of the volume.
22George and Smoke 1974, p. 64; Long 2008, pp. 7–8.
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intensity and scope of the conflict.23 These four themes are given elaborate treat-
ment in the CDD literature in the context of today’s challenges.24
8.3.2 Attribution
CDD authors point out that the emergence of new domains and the proliferation of
hostile actors complicates attribution in the cross-domain context. Both state and
non-state actors can dispose of a range of military and non-military instruments to
cause damage from afar. Geographic proximity is no longer required. Proxy wars
have become increasingly salient, in the context of a steep increase in interna-
tionalized intrastate conflicts.25 The democratization of the means of violence in
combination with the foggy nature of new domains, especially cyber space, are
singled out as formidable challenges to attribution in the cross domain context.26
Special Forces and irregular combatants without uniforms, both of which are hard
to identify, constitute key actors of choice to carry out contemporary military
operations.27 Low cost unmanned aerial vehicles enable conflict actors, including
non-state actors such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria and the Houthis in Yemen, to target
objects of value from a safe distance.28 Individual grey zone events “are difficult to
distinguish from one-off actions, statecraft, or diplomacy”.29 In the virtual realm,
offenders can avoid attribution by hiding behind the anonymity provided by cyber
space.30 Though cyber attribution is possible in general, it is seldom certain in
particular cases.31 Perpetrators can exploit the complexity of cyberspace to pretend
they act on behalf of a third party.32 Furthermore, collecting sufficient evidence
about the origins of cyber-attacks may take months.33 By that time, too much time
has passed for an effective response to effectuate deterrence.34 Attribution in space
brings its own set of challenges. The devices that scan the environment, those
which keep track of space systems’ health as well as those which identify the
23Morgan et al. 2008, p. 8.
24And in practical tabletop exercises, such as Wuest 2018.
25Innes 2012.
26Lehman 2019, p. 78.
27Cormac and Aldrich 2018, p. 479.
28Sayler 2015.
29Sheppard and Conklin 2019, p. 1.
30Nye 2017, pp. 49–52; Kello 2017, pp. 198–200.
31Klimburg 2017.
32Andres 2017, p. 94.
33Brantly 2018a, pp. 41, 45.
34Schneider 2019, pp. 105–6; Jackson 2019, p. 114.
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origins of the hostile activities, have many blind spots.35 Additionally, actors in
possession of space assets will likely only know they have been attacked because of
the effects of the attack. Also, space weather can produce damage akin to the
adversarial action.36 The origins of the attack and the identity of the perpetrator are
therefore hard to pin down. The widespread use of non-military measures adds
another layer of complexity to the attribution challenge. The different actors taking
part in election meddling, disinformation campaigns, espionage, intelligence theft,
critical infrastructure infiltration, political corruption or market stock manipulation
may be hard to identify in acceptable time frames, or at all.37 Overall, recent
technological progress combined with the proliferation of actors and domains
complicates attribution in both military and non-military domains and across them.
Yet, CDD scholars come up with various solutions to these obstacles to attri-
bution which are first and foremost practical and technical rather than theoretical in
nature. In general, the scholars acknowledge that the solutions to the attribution
challenge across domains require international and inter-organizational cooperation,
information sharing, technical expertise, analytical skills as well as political will. To
deal with the hard-to-identify non-state actors and the wide spectrum of instruments
at their disposal, it is suggested to attribute and threaten those upon whose help the
non-state actors may be dependent. The assumption here is that these supporting
actors are often states, which should render attribution easier.38 In cyberspace,
solutions are sought in the combination of technical, cognitive and behavioural
expertise to help lift the fog of anonymity and enable effective responses.39 It is
argued that cross triangulation of the digital footprint, geographical origin, modus
operandi, as well as geopolitical intent, renders attribution in cyber space in fact
possible in the fast majority of cases.40 Adversarial interest is also singled out as
being particularly relevant in the attribution process.41 Additionally, cyber-attacks
intended to cause serious damage are more likely than not to be accompanied by
non-cyber measures, which should also help identify the potential perpetrator.42
Lack of political will may be a bigger obstacle than technical limitations. It is
pointed out, for instance, that Obama’s administration was well aware of the
identity of the election meddling perpetrators in 2016 but nonetheless decided not to
35Suzuki 2018, p. 45.
36Harrison 2014, p. 117.
37See for example Treverton 2018.
38Mallory 2018, pp. 10–17.
39Iasiello 2014, p. 58.
40Valeriano and Maness 2015, p. 10. See the guide to cyber attribution specifying general indi-
cators and examples of successful attribution by Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018.
41Blagden 2020.
42Davis 2017, p. 80.
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ascribe responsibility publicly so as to avoid further escalation.43 It is also argued
that the attribution problem can be bypassed by heavier reliance on deterrence by
denial. Deterrence by denial in the cyber context can be further enhanced by
military, political or economic measures to secure physical infrastructure and
supply lines.44 Attribution in the cyber domain is thus certainly more complex but
authors argue that obstacles can be solved with the appropriate amount of expertise
and will.
Myriad solutions to attribution problems in other domains are also proposed. In
space, CDD authors focus not only on the hardening of satellite assets to bolster
deterrence through denial; they also suggest the strengthening of situational
awareness through monitoring capabilities that enable attribution; the assessment of
geopolitical risk based on analysis of strategic intent and space capabilities; and the
traditional exploitation of human intelligence sources.45 In the terrestrial military
domains, it is argued that attribution is progressively less of a problem. Attribution
of actions executed by irregular forces can exploit data from social media, photos
and position tracking applications.46 Western countries were thus able to identify
and attribute Russian troop movements near the Ukrainian border during the
summer of 2014. Likewise, the US was able to quickly ascribe the 2019 hostile
activities in the Persian Gulf to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards units.47 North
Korean missiles launches over the past decade were also time and again detected by
US satellite systems.48 Finally, attribution of actions outside these military domains
can also be enhanced, it is suggested, by tracing overall patterns. Authors point out
for instance that one diplomatic visit of a foreign official may not be significant, but
when placed in a broader picture, and when combined with other actions, it may
allow for the identification of an overall pattern of coercive activities.49 On a more
practical note, Linda Robinson et al. suggest that hybrid campaign analysis units
that can expose systematic patterns and generate more holistic threat pictures, will
contribute to cross domain attribution capabilities.50 In sum, authors in the
refinement strand suggest that attribution challenges can be addressed and over-
come largely through the implementation of a series of practical recommendations.
43Healey 2018.
44Schneider 2019, pp. 112–113.
45Harrison 2014, p. 117; Kopec 2019, p. 123; Bahney et al. 2019, p. 139.
46Mallory 2018, p. 13.
47Yee et al. 2019.
48Wall 2019.
49Sheppard and Conklin 2019, p. 1.
50Robinson et al. 2018.
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8.3.3 Threat Credibility and Proportionality
The issue of how to render deterrent threats credible in CDD is made more com-
plicated by the inherent disproportionality of responses across domains and
instruments of power.51 In short, decision makers lack agreed-upon guidelines for
proportional responses to the wide array of potential hostilities in CDD.52 This is
different from within-domain deterrence as Thomas Schelling’s captured in his
observation that “there is an idiom in this interaction, a tendency to keeps things in
the same currency, to respond in the same language, to make the punishment fit the
character of the crime.”53
The conversion mechanism between violent and non-violent actions and their
effects is seen as the biggest hurdle to threat proportionality.54 Using violence
against non-violent hostilities such as theft, espionage, infiltration or election
meddling is likely to be seen as disproportionate by many. This is further exacer-
bated by the multitude of state and non-state actors, each of which may have
different beliefs about the appropriate conversion ratio between violent and
non-violent measures.55 As one scholar puts it, “while the United States could
threaten to retaliate against cyberattacks asymmetrically through economic sanc-
tions or military threats, there is a significant chance that such actions would appear
escalatory, disproportionate, or otherwise inappropriate to the American public or
the international community.”56 Furthermore, actors operating through cyberspace
are likely to have different degrees of tolerance for escalation risks because of their
“anonymity, invulnerability, and global flexibility”.57 This exacerbates the pro-
portionality asymmetry because it is not clear how individual actors and groups
appraise the severity of cyberattacks. Moreover, retaliatory threats involving actions
in cyberspace may have significant second and third order consequences. Their
ultimate proportionality is thus hard to assess beforehand.58 Additionally, propa-
ganda, infiltration, espionage, economic sanctions and stock market manipulations
tend to produce their effects slower than the implements of violence on land, on sea,
in the air or in space.59 Ultimately the conversion ratio between violent and
non-violent measures is unclear because the former tend to have more direct and
immediate effects while the latter tend to rely on more gradual and second order
effects.
51See for instance Dawkins 2009, p. 12.
52Morrow 2019, pp. 187–188.
53Schelling 1966, pp. 146–149.
54Waxman 2013, pp. 111–113.
55Lewis 2010, pp. 2–3.
56Andres 2017, p. 96.
57Trujillo 2014, p. 49.
58Romanosky and Goldman 2016.
59Milevski 2019.
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Even when it comes to conversion within single instruments of violence or
against similar targets, proportionality assessments are not necessarily straightfor-
ward. For example, in space, the problem of proportionality is exacerbated by the
differences in value which the individual actors tend to place on the same assets.
The US is much more dependent than China on its satellites, both for military and
civilian purposes. Therefore, the simple cost-benefit equation of destroying one
satellite for each one destroyed by the enemy is asymmetric and therefore dispro-
portional.60 In fact, the costs incurred by the US are disproportionately higher.61 It
is argued that this undermines the credibility of US threats to harm space assets of
states that do not rely on these systems in equal measure.62 Finally, attacks against
targets in and through new domains may cause considerable collateral damage
which again further complicates proportionality assessments. For example, retali-
ation against space objects may cause debris which can threaten both friendly and
hostile activities in outer space.63 Alternatively, threatening terrestrial attacks in
response to hostilities against satellites may be deemed disproportionate because the
former may result in human casualties while the latter is likely to produce only
material damage.64 In this regard, authors point at patterns of failed deterrence when
it comes to deterring less destructive hostilities.65
In tackling proportionality and credibility in CDD, scholars propose various
solutions. In general, authors discuss strengthening cross domain deterrent postures
by explicitly formulating cross domain threats in deterring domain specific actions,
for instance by including conventional or even nuclear responses to enhance the
credibility of threats seeking to deter attacks on critical assets in cyber space and
space.66 Some treatments suggest that a degree of proportionality can be established
by focusing on the effects of specific actions rather than on the specific instruments
used in this process.67 Schneider, for example, speculates that cyber sabotage of a
radar system can be countered proportionately by the electromagnetic jamming of a
similar target. However, as she notes, this is likely to work better with direct, kinetic
effects than with less direct, and less tangible effects. Smeets and Lin point out that
states can build up credibility by regularly deploying a capability in practice. Actors
with a clear track record of using particular capabilities, whether violent or not, may
60Lewis 2010, p. 3.
61Suzuki 2018, p. 46.
62Lambakis 2019, p. 503; Morgan 2010, p. xiii.
63Kopec 2019, pp. 125–126.
64Bahney et al. 2019, p. 140.
65Lewis 2013, p. 62.
66Lindsay 2015, p. 58.
67Manzo 2011, p. 7.
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be able to develop sufficient reputation to offset the lack of credibility posed by the
instruments themselves.68
CDD is seen as particularly relevant in the context of cyber deterrence. It is
argued that cyber deterrence also requires a broad mix of military, diplomatic,
economic and legal measures,69 synchronised within an overall deterrence posture.
To bolster credibility, “cyber deterrence needs to be a well-integrated defence
component that is in tune with non-cyber policy initiatives, and to accomplish this,
policymakers need to juxtapose carefully cyber deterrence means and ends to those
involved in broader defence policies”.70 For the sake of credibility, cyber deterrence
improvements need to be “mutually reinforcing”, to have the potential to surprise
the adversaries as well as to flexibly manoeuvre between both denial and punish-
ment options. Furthermore, some argue that states are likely to consider truly
destructive cyberattacks as regular acts of war, which should make threats of
conventional military retaliation credible, as international law already allows such
responses when the principles of necessity and proportionality are adhered to.71
Some scholars are also optimistic about the credibility of other non-violent
measures. It is argued that election meddling too can be deterred by the threats of
economic sanctions targeted against energy, banking and defence sectors.72
Additionally, in response to serious threats posed by authoritarian governments,
Western democracies can threaten to disrupt the former’s protected information
sphere and to leak sensitive information about the regime’s misconduct to the
foreign public.73 Finally, as Jervis reminds us, it is necessary to realize that “threats
need not be completely credible in order to be effective”: it may be enough for
threats to be probable rather than certain, no matter whether one employs violent or
non-violent measures; “credibility is not an objective, nor is it a property of the
person or state making the threat. Rather it is ‘owned’ by the target.”74 This
underscores that conversion rates ultimately hinge on the perception of the
beholder.
To deal with the proportionality issue as it relates to violent instruments, a
generic solution that is proposed is to rely on a set of strategies to resolve the
proportionality issue in different contexts. Anthony Juarez for instance lists
counter-force, counter value, tit for tat, denial and ambiguity as potential options.75
It is also argued that the supposed asymmetries in interests and values as related to
space should not be overrated. For example, while some nations may not be as
68Smeets and Lin 2018, p. 63. Although the overall role of reputation is contested see for instance
Mercer 1996; Press 2005.
69Wilner 2019, p. 9.
70Mandel 2017, p. 234.
71Davis 2017, p. 80.
72Wright 2019.
73Mallory 2018, p. 11.
74Jervis 2016, pp. 67–68.
75Juarez 2016, p. 6.
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dependent on the satellites for their military utility, they may still value them highly
for economic, cultural or prestige reasons and will therefore consider them vital
assets.76 With respect to the US it is said that it can credibly threaten retaliation
against attacks aimed at its space assets everywhere precisely because its space
assets are so important.77 To deal with the disproportionality issue, it is recom-
mended to focus on the overall effects rather than on specific instruments. In the
context of space, this should involve a broad menu of “kinetic or non-kinetic attacks
on adversary command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C3ISR) and reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and attack
(RSTA) assets in the land, air, and sea domains”.78 Overall, the recommendations
from authors who are concerned with the effectuation of CDD in this refinement
strand focus on establishing proportionality and increasing credibility through the
adoption of a combination of these practical measures.
8.3.4 Signalling
Signalling in the cross-domain context is more complex for two reasons which are
closely related to establishing proportionality. First, it is harder to relate signals
about particular actions in one domain to anticipated reactions in another in line
with Schelling’s previously cited observation. Moreover, while signals relying on
military instruments may resonate more than those relying on non-military instru-
ments, they also come with higher risks of misunderstandings. For example, a
signal of resolve to respond to cyberattacks by moving platforms for the launch of
conventional or nuclear weapons may be easily interpreted as a preparation for
hostilities rather than as an adjustment of the deterrence posture.79 Conversely,
signalling purely in cyber space may be difficult, because unlike in other domains,
the relevant infrastructure of that domain is not under the exclusive control of the
government.80 Consequently, signals may get lost or be ignored by the adver-
saries.81 Striking the right balance between over signalling on the one hand and
under signalling on the other thus constitutes a paramount challenge to commu-
nication in the cross domain context. Second, a number of modern instruments and
tactics are effective precisely because they are secret. This implies a serious
trade-off for the signaller who runs the risk of losing the advantage yielded by the
capability the moment it signals its possession. After all, it allows adversaries to
devise effective countermeasures, which is especially pertinent in cyberspace, but
76Harrison 2014, p. 115.
77Buckley 2018.
78Mallory 2018, p. 10.
79Manzo 2015, p. 97.
80Rovner 2019.
81Iasiello 2014, p. 57; Valeriano and Maness 2015, p. 60.
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also applies to hybrid operations.82 This then raises the question of how to signal
true capabilities while maintaining their utility for prospective hostilities.
CDD authors discuss an assortment of, once again, predominantly practical
measures to meet these signalling challenges. For example, it is argued that the
issue of tying threats across domains can be tackled by synchronized signalling at
different levels of conflict. At the political level, signalling takes the form of public
and private communication as well as norm development, at the strategic level it
conveys the developments of doctrines about the actions and reactions, and at the
tactical level it contains the actual application of particular forms of power to
demonstrate resolve and capabilities.83 The US successful orchestration of this kind
of effort across different levels to signal its discontent with Chinese espionage
activities during the Obama administration is a case in point.84 To signal the
relationship between different domains is thus possible but it requires the syner-
gistic employment of communication across more levels than previously.
To tackle the issue of secrecy versus effectiveness, several suggestions are
offered. One approach, which builds upon the recognition of the temporary nature
of cyber capabilities noted by several scholars, may rely on building up a redundant
portfolio of those capabilities, some of which can then be regularly used to
demonstrate cyber capabilities.85 The logic behind this option is that cyber weapons
by their very nature are transitory—they lose their effectiveness over time because
cyber vulnerabilities are exposed and patched.86 Therefore, they can be disposed of
for signalling both capability and resolve without losing their effectiveness. Other
scholars suggest alternative ways that bypass the issue altogether by public
advertisement of attribution technologies.87 This way actors signal both their will
and capabilities to allocate blame if necessary alongside announcement of the type
of weapons and/or attacks they consider to be the most threatening. It is also argued
that cyber weapons in fact possess signalling advantages compared to traditional
instruments on the grounds that they can be used in a demonstration of force
without starting the conflict they seek to prevent because they do not necessarily
involve violent, kinetic effects.88 That quality renders them sufficient to signal
intent while avoiding escalation.89 Additionally, states can rely on a combination of
public speeches and real action to signal their cyber-capabilities. More states have
been openly talking about the possession of sufficient cyber capabilities in recent
82Green and Long 2019, p. 206
83Sweijs and Zilincik 2019, p. 24.
84Brantly 2018a, pp. 18–19.
85Smeets 2017.
86Ablon and Bogart 2017.
87Lindsay 2015, p. 58.
88Lonsdale’s argument does not go uncontested. See for example Stone 2013. Also, Lonsdale
himself concedes that though non-violent in their nature, cyberattacks can produce violent con-
sequences indirectly.
89Lonsdale 2018, p. 417; Schneider 2019, pp. 116–117.
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years, some of whom have followed up with actions, such as Russia in Ukraine and
the US in the context of its strategy of persistent engagement.90 Some actors may be
willing to signal more than others because of their strategic culture.91 Signalling
one’s capabilities may even not inevitably lead to the loss of effectiveness, because
not all adversaries are able or willing to patch the revealed vulnerabilities,92
Moreover, cross domain signalling by military, political or economic measures may
alleviate the problem with clandestine capabilities because conventional forces,
diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions do not lose their effectiveness once
exercised in an adversarial relationship.93 CDD refinement authors thus conceive a
combination of these practical measures to facilitate signalling across domains and
solve the trade-off between secrecy and effectiveness.
A number of suggestions have also been presented with respect to signalling
outside of the cyber domain. King Mallory observes that signalling can rely on
explicit moral Manicheism through clear verbal statement that there is no middle
ground or grey zone in order to persuade adversaries that any kind of hostilities,
direct or indirect, will lead to retaliation.94 Signalling of both will and capability is
also possible against hybrid intrusions, especially with rapidly deployable response
teams of police and Special Forces which convey to the adversary that it is not
likely to achieve its interests. Other means of signalling include implicit warnings
reflected in changes in postures in combination with public statements.95 Others
suggest that “acts of retorsion” including economic sanctions and diplomatic
coercion/isolation are perfect signalling instruments.96 The authors in this literature
have thus come up with a broad portfolio of signalling measures across all domains.
8.3.5 Escalation Management
The combination of issues discussed in relationship to attribution, threat propor-
tionality and signalling makes escalation management much more difficult in
CDD.97 The attribution problem injects uncertainty into the deterrence relationship
because it renders unclear under which conditions the deterring actor will deem it
appropriate to escalate. Challenges associated with credibility and proportionality
undermine basic tenets of successful escalation management simply because of the
90Klimburg 2020; Geers 2015.
91Schneider 2019, pp. 117–118.
92Green and Long 2019, p. 231. Lindsay 2015, p. 58.
93Lindsay 2015, p. 58.
94Mallory 2018, pp. 10–15.
95Lewis 2010, p. 4.
96Davis 2017, p. 81.
97See the concluding section in “A New Look at the 21st Century Crossdomain Deterrence
Initiative” 2016.
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unpredictable dynamics across domains. Complexity of signalling further befuddles
escalation management in practice because it is unclear whether signals are both
sent and received. Accordingly, the diversity of escalation dynamics of cross
domain deterrence is singled out as “a core analytic issue”.98
An assortment of sources of instability for escalation management in CDD are
discussed many of which are directly or indirectly related to issues addressed
previously. First and foremost, there is no shared framework to describe and
therefore manage escalation across domains.99 Without such a framework “decision
makers will have difficulty distinguishing between proportional and escalatory
attacks and reprisals that cross from traditional strategic domains into these newer
ones and vice versa”.100 Second, there are many sources of instability when it
comes to particular measures and weapons across domains. Western superiority in
conventional weapons motivates adversaries to actively seek and exploit asym-
metric and diverse measures with varying kinetic and non-kinetic effects and with
differing degrees of proportionality.101 Some of the instruments and tactics operate
across domains that cross potential thresholds faster than in the past.102 In this
context, the use of unmanned and semi-autonomous systems and, in the future,
other AI enhanced weapon systems may be particularly destabilizing.103
Furthermore, the nature of the cyber and space domains and the character of
technologies used in these domains may generate escalation risks through
first-strike instabilities.104 This renders these domains not only inherently unstable
but also implies spill over effects to other domains in CDD.105 Consequently, the
anticipated effects are sometimes difficult to gauge before their actual employ-
ment.106 Third, proportionality perceptions of actions in particular domains vary
considerably from one actor to the next.107 For example, Russia and China tend to
see the integration of military, political and economic tools in a much more holistic
fashion and for this reason they are likely to appraise the conversion rate between
individual domains differently. As Adamsky explains in this volume and elsewhere
the Russians combine nuclear, conventional and information measures to deter
continuously and across domains.108 Dean Cheng in this volume and elsewhere,
describes the Chinese understanding of deterrence to involve “political activity and
98Brimley 2010, p. 129.
99As Jervis points out, even frameworks for cyber domain escalations are rare to come by. See
Jervis 2016, p. 71.
100Manzo 2011, p. 4.
101Andres 2017, p. 92; Wilner 2019, p. 9.
102Morgan et al. 2008, p. 168.
103Johnson 2020.
104Frear et al. 2018, p. 16.
105Kopec 2019, p. 125.
106Manzo 2015, p. 97.
107Manzo 2011, p. 4; Lewis 2010, p. 3.
108Adamsky 2015, p. 37.
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psychological warfare”.109 Any combination of these three challenges may hinder
attempts at successful escalation management in any particular conflict.
CDD authors once again have come up with a range of proposals how to address
these issues. First and foremost, they agree that it is necessary to develop a shared
framework which would encompass the expectations for escalation dynamics.110
There are several distinct approaches to the development of a shared framework.
Some scholars point to the salient function of international law. Game theorist
James Morrow, for example, argues that the developments in international law can
constitute a first step towards the development of such a framework. Law alleviates
the uncertainties about proportionality by explicitly stating what is acceptable, what
is the appropriate response as well as how these actions relate across specific
domains. As a coordination mechanism, law contributes to a common under-
standing of proportionality. Though it is unlikely to eliminate competition, it may
channel hostilities into more manageable forms.111 In this vein, others argue that an
international cyber warfare convention would improve the prospects for both
deterrence by punishment and by denial “by clarifying what counts [as] an act of
cyber-aggression and what level of retaliation is deemed acceptable by the inter-
national community, an ICWC would thereby enhance states’ capacity to adopt and
communicate an effective deterrent posture”.112 Another perspective on framework
development builds upon the notion of different kinds of escalation ladders,
including a “provocation framework” to elucidate thresholds in “grey-zone” com-
petition and improve escalation management by helping “policymakers understand
the value of their actions and how reciprocal and proportional responses achieve
strategic effect… ”.113 Such a framework is supposed to work as an explicit
“declaratory policy” to signal both commitment and expectations of proportionality.
Attempts have also been made to further develop escalation ladders to establish
the logic of escalation in the context of single domains,114 as well as in the inter-
action between different domains.115
Here, an interesting schism about whether to focus on instruments or on effects
emerges. On one hand, it has been argued for cross domain frameworks to be based
on the “severity of various military and non-military actions based on the full range
of their anticipated effects, rather than assuming that military actions represent an
escalation from non-military actions”.116 On the other hand, “cyber operations
might not have the same saliency or emotional effect as conventional operations—
109Cheng 2017, p. 1.
110Manzo 2015, p. 92; Sweijs et al. 2016, p. 60.
111Morrow 2019, pp. 198–204.
112Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018, p. 398.
113Ruecking 2018, p. 15.
114Kopec 2019, p. 126; Szymanski 2019, p. 97.
115Caton 2019, pp. 28–32.
116Rosenberg and Tama 2019, p. 9.
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even when they create the same physically destructive effects”.117 This second line
of research, therefore, indicates that psychological effects vary across different
instruments regardless of the physical damage these instruments cause.118
Relatedly, it is also possible that cyber instruments are “poor tools for escalatory
purposes” because of the limited cost-generation potential of offensive cyber
operations”.119 This echoes the observations that actors tend to deescalate rather
than escalate in the cyber domain because cyber tools enable actors to release
tensions by “sub crisis management manoeuvring”.120 These practical ideas con-
cerning the development of shared frameworks, whether alone or in some combi-
nation, thus seek to address problems associated with escalation management in
CDD.
Authors working on CDD have also proposed several solutions to tackle the
problems of destabilizing measures and of varying perceptions of proportionality.
To deal with the former, it may be wise to avoid offensive activity with specific
weapons (nuclear) and against specific targets (command and control).121
Additionally, the vulnerable assets should be better protected. Satellites should be
dispersed across broad space and have their passive and active defences
improved.122 Economic interdependence too, may have a stabilizing effect by
motivating restraint in interactions. Finally, new domains tend to create mutual
vulnerabilities which can incentivize prudence and caution out of fear for retalia-
tion. Declarations of restraint as well as the developments of some basic thresholds
for response are seen as time tested mechanisms.123 This may prove particularly
useful in the cyber and space domains. Other recommendations lean towards the
opposite direction, with experts suggesting not to show restraint but rather to show
resolve and the will to retaliate in order to establish escalation dominance up
front.124 How to combine the two contradictory approaches continues to be a
pernicious problem, and requires future research and also practice to solve.125 The
ideal situation is the one in which each actor can exercise restraint but still radiate
resolve.126 These diverging recommendations imply that successful escalation
management depends on the practical application in particular contexts rather than
on general truths. Overall, the solutions for escalation management proposed in the
refinement camp are of a predominantly practical nature. They build on, but do not
117Schneider 2019, p. 119.
118Kreps and Schneider 2019.
119Borghard and Lonergan 2019.
120Jensen and Valeriano 2019, p. 40.
121Manzo 2015, pp. 94–97.
122Harrison 2014, p. 116; MacDonald 2013, pp. 91; Morgan 2010, pp. xiv–xv.
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extend, the logic of classic deterrence theory while offering a range of valuable
practical insights how to effectuate CDD in today’s world.
8.4 Refinement and Reinterpretation—Expansion
and Reconceptualisation
The second strand in the CDD literature argues that the character of contemporary
challenges requires the broadening and deepening of our understanding of deter-
rence. Instead of offering practical recommendations on how to effectuate CDD in
light of changing strategic conditions, authors propose theoretical and conceptual
additions and innovations to existing concepts of deterrence rooted in deterrence by
punishment and deterrence by denial. Some authors offer additional theoretical
concepts to update deterrence; other authors in effect seek to reconceptualise
deterrence in light of the nature of cross-domain challenges. This stems from the
recognition and conviction that new domains require new approaches. Finding
incremental practical fixes simply does not suffice, so they argue. It is thought that
the traditional parameters that may have allowed deterrence to work in previous
times, simply no longer hold in the context of today’s multipolar, connected and
complex strategic environment. The greater diversity of actors that dispose of an
even greater diversity of means that can successfully threaten each other in this
environment either undermines deterrence or may even render it impossible.
8.4.1 Refinement of Traditional Concepts of Deterrence
Some of the additions are theoretical refinements. For instance, in order to deter
across both old and new domains, concepts such as cumulative, punctuated and
layered deterrence have been introduced. The concept of cumulative deterrence is
based on Israel’s strategic experience. Israel has defended itself against a diverse
spectrum of attacks conducted by state and non-state actors over a long period of
time, partly by “attacking the rival repeatedly in response to specific behaviours,
over a long period of time, sometimes even disproportionally to its aggressive
actions”.127 Or, as we put it in a previous publication on cross domain deterrence in
the context of hybrid conflict, “cumulative deterrence conceptualises deterrence as a
continuous, longer term process in which a one-off transgression does not spell
failure but adversarial behaviour is shaped by the deterrer in a concerted effort.”128
Within the framework of cumulative deterrence, deterrers understand the necessity
of absorbing some attacks in order to prevent others. This marks a clear departure
127Tor 2015, p. 112.
128Sweijs and Zilincik 2019, p. 23.
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from a more absolutist notion encapsulated in traditional deterrence approaches
aimed at deterring all attacks. The concept of cumulative deterrence may indeed be
better suited to the less impactful but more frequent and ambiguous amalgamation
of contemporary security threats and actors rather than to deterring the threat of a
nuclear attack.129 Another alternative is punctuated deterrence, which conveys
punishment to address a series of actions and cumulative effects. The difference
between cumulative and punctuated deterrence is that within the framework of
cumulative deterrence, deterrers respond continuously over long time periods to
single attacks, while in the case of punctuated deterrence they respond gradually
over time and in a punctuated manner.130 In the context of space deterrence, some
authors have come up with the notion of layered deterrence, which includes a
simultaneous combination of international norms, entanglement, retaliation, and
denial of benefit which can be conducted across domains.131
8.4.2 Reinterpretation of Deterrence by Denial
In trying to come to terms with the nature of today’s strategic challenges, authors
have also sought to expand on traditional concepts of deterrence by denial and
punishment, even trying to merge the two into one mechanism. Recent years have
seen the introduction of notions such as offensive denial and resilient denial,
punishment through stigmatization, and entanglement, as well as the substitution of
dissuasion for deterrence. With respect to deterrence by denial authors have
introduced the distinction between tactical and strategic denial.132 Tactical denial
refers to denying the adversary the prospect of attaining the direct impact of a
particular hostile action, while strategic denial refers to denying it the political
benefits that it expects to derive. While the former still aligns with traditional
conceptions of deterrence by denial, the latter constitutes a significant broadening of
the concept. Yet also tactical denial has been significantly expanded, most
importantly by including offensive pre-emptive action. Traditional deterrence the-
oreticians assumed that denial is inherently tied to defensive measures, whether
active or passive ones. The complexity and the opportunities presented by today’s
strategic landscape domains have led them to theorise ways in which offensive
action can be used to deny the adversaries the means to conduct offensive action.
This, again, is discussed most often in relation to the cyber domain.133 It is also
observable in strategic practice, as the US has started to pursue its persistent
engagement, which is it seeks to “defend forward” by preventively denying the
129Rid 2012, p. 125.
130Kello 2017, pp. 208–209.
131Harrison et al. 2009, pp. 17–26.
132Kroenig and Pavel 2012.
133Sharma 2010.
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adversaries their means for the conduct of hostile operations.134 The underlying
logic, however, as such holds for every other domain in which offensive means can
degrade the adversaries’ capabilities to fight before the actual hostile interaction
takes place. It is possible to conceive of denial in more traditional domains as
encapsulating pre-emptive or preventive strikes against adversarial military capa-
bilities.135 Similarly, Israel has relied on a strategy of cumulative attrition in order
to deter its enemies from carrying out immediate attacks by denying them the
capability to do so.136 Besides, capabilities in other domains tend to rely on cyber
measures to varying degrees hence the use of offensive denial may impact land,
naval, air and space domains as well. Overall, this approach recognizes the fact that
the adversaries’ capabilities and their will to fight may be dependent upon each
other and thus by denying the opportunity to use those capabilities is also likely to
degrade their will to fight.
Where it comes to strategic denial, resilience is singled out as a key compo-
nent.137 Resilience is conceived as the ability to absorb the direct impact of the
hostile activity in question without suffering any long-lasting impact. While orig-
inally proposed in the context of deterring terrorist attacks, recent scholarship
proposes that resilience can be a strategic asset across multiple domains of com-
petition and may be effective against both state and non-state actors.138 Ultimately,
strengthening resilience is envisaged as a cross domain effort because its objective
is to prepare whole societies in a cross sectoral approach to withstand adversarial
activities. Once attained, resilience then signals to the adversaries the futility of
carrying out potential attacks by nullifying the potential benefits to be derived from
a broad spectrum of hostile measures. To deal with the ever-increasing complexity
of contemporary actors and domains, deterrence by denial has thus been concep-
tually stretched by including new approaches that include other types of effects.
8.4.3 Expansion of Deterrence by Punishment: Norms,
Delegitimisation and Entanglement
Scholars have also proposed a broader gamut of measures encompassed under
deterrence by punishment. The traditional concept is expanded to encompass
deterrence through norms, delegitimisation and entanglement. Punishment through
norms seeks to convince potential transgressors not to engage in certain behaviour
134Healey 2019.
135Wirtz 2018, p. 70.
136Efraim and Shamir 2014.
137See also Chap. 18 in this volume by Cees van Doorn and Theo Brinkel.
138Hartmann 2017; Hellman 2019.
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by presenting them with the prospect of social costs.139 It seeks to alter the cost
calculus of those who do not abide by the positive standards of behaviour, while
deterrence by taboos seeks to do the same to those who engage in hostilities that are
generally seen as off-limits. Breaking any of these two standards risks incurring not
only a domestic backlash but also the loss of international prestige and ostracisation
which is detrimental to vital interests of both state and non-state actors. Deterrence
by association expands on that logic. It constitutes “a political mechanism in order
to ‘call-out’ poor behaviour and strongly condemn such actions publicly, by those
with the right authority, because it acts as a clear signal to others in the community
of actors what is right and wrong behaviour”.140 This extended version of deter-
rence by punishment is increasingly being discussed in the context of deterrence in
new domains and in relation to both state and non-state actors but is equally
applicable to any other domain.141
A second alternative strategy, delegitimisation, is loosely based on the logic of
punishment as it aims “to raise the costs of participating in terrorism by challenging
the normative, religious, and socio-political rationales individuals rely upon when
participating in violence”.142 Authors in this strand also argue that this approach
allows for the classification of both particular instruments and particular targets as
unacceptable. The traditional deterrence literature also addressed this, but it may be
even more relevant in the cross-domain context, because the new context makes it
possible to channel the conflict into more manageable domains. In some cases, such
as with nuclear threats, the focus on the stigmatisation of particular weapons may be
more effective. For instance, the stigmatisation of biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons which has developed gradually during the last century, was closely con-
nected to the destructive nature of these weapons.143 This logic may be applicable
to space deterrence too if it is accepted “that encouraging behavioural norms
regarding the peaceful use of space—and thereby increasing the political stigma of
using weapons in space—is desirable…” because “even relatively weak political
stigmas can deter attacks in space for players with something to lose.”144 It is
plausible, for example, that attacks against satellites should be discouraged by the
development of an appropriate normative framework.145 In other cases, such as the
cyber domain, targets rather than instruments may warrant more attention.146
Deterrence through norms may thus adhere to the original logic of deterrence by
violent punishment but certainly stretches its scope. It relies on a broader concept of
139Ryan 2017.
140Ryan 2017, p. 335.
141Nye 2017, p. 62.
142Wilner 2011, p. 27.
143Shamai 2020.
144Triezenberg 2017, p. 2.
145Lewis 2013, p. 79.
146Nye 2017, p. 61.
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punishment by including the social and psychological costs in order to deter actions
from engaging in certain behaviour.
A third way in which traditional concepts of punishment are stretched revolves
around entanglement.147 Entanglement relies on fostering interdependence between
actors and contributes to deterrence success by shaping the cost calculus of
potential adversaries, as suggested by Joseph Nye. The assumption is that actors
entangled in mutually dependency relationships will refrain from launching attacks
because they themselves will incur costs too. It works by persuading potential
adversaries that the continuation of the status quo is in their own interest, hence
they should be reluctant to launch an attack in the first place.148 The logic of
entanglement, in the cyber domain and beyond, works by “adding more factors into
the deterrence cost calculus— economic, political and diplomatic, for instance—
then an adversary can be entangled…since they would have to suffer the conse-
quences in other areas of their relations.”149 Essentially, entanglement operates by
“mutual establishment and recognition as well as perception management of ben-
efits both in the present and over time”.150 Or, to put it another way, entanglement
works by persuading the relevant actors that they are “stakeholders in cyberspace”
which should motivate them to exercise restraint in offensive behaviour.151 Due to
their mutual interdependence, this kind of deterrence is most often discussed in the
context of the overall Sino-American relationship.152 But that logic may also apply
to the space domain because attacks against commercial satellites can impede
international trade and finance.153 Deterrence through norms and deterrence
through entanglement are thus seen as necessary expansions in today’s globally
connected world. The theoretical innovations offered expand the scope of deter-
rence by taking a more holistic view of the overall incentive structure of potential
targets of deterrence and including less tangible factors such as identity and social
belief systems into consideration as well as non-military dimensions to affect the
cost-benefit calculus of potential adversaries.
8.4.4 From Deterrence to Dissuasion
Finally, authors argue that deterrence of contemporary threats requires expanding
classical concepts of deterrence not just in terms of the ways and means but also in
its very nature. Taking stock of the theoretical additions and innovations to address
147Brantly 2018a.
148Nye 2017, p. 58.
149Ryan 2017, pp. 336–337.
150Brantly 2018b.
151Jasper 2015, p. 67.
152Pontbriand 2019.
153Rao et al. 2017, p. 55.
150 T. Sweijs and S. Zilincik
today’s challenges, they argue that our common understanding of deterrence needs
to be reconceptualised or rather that fundamental features that were mentioned in
the classic deterrence literature require much greater emphasis. They argue that
deterrence will have to focus both on persuasion and dissuasion and include both
positive and negative incentives in order to prevent adversaries from engaging in
undesired behaviour. Dissuasion, for example, can be seen within a broader
approach to deterrence as a form that includes both threats and inducements but also
“reassurances and benefits that make a world without aggression more attrac-
tive”.154 The advantage of dissuasion is that it can be pursued “through interna-
tional institutions, treaties, economic sanctions, raising reputation costs, soft
balancing, and diplomatic engagement”.155 Dissuasion, a subset of what can be
termed “compliance seeking efforts’’, is supposed to include not only negative but
also positive measures and it can work both by increasing the attractiveness of
particular options and by decreasing the desirability of others.156 While these
ruminations may seem to be a classic case of concept creep, it is worth noting that
they can also be considered a rediscovery of insights already coined by classical
deterrence theorists. After all, in the early 1960s Glenn Snyder defined deterrence as
“the power to dissuade” which is done by “the implicit or explicit threat of applying
some sanction if the forbidden act is performed, or by the promise of a reward if the
act is not performed” so that it constitutes “a process of influencing the enemy’s
intentions, whatever the circumstances”.157
8.5 Conclusion
Strategic concepts emerge in particular strategic contexts to deal with specific
challenges in a given period. Some strategic concepts wither away once the
strategic environment evolves, others persist but are adapted. Our review of the
CDD literature finds a thriving scholarly and professional debate about the use and
utility of deterrence in the context of today’s cross domain challenges. Our review
reveals significant continuities but also significant changes in the insights offered by
the CDD literature compared to the preceding waves in the deterrence literature.
Deterrence has been cross domain in character since its early beginnings, prompting
some to pose the question whether CDD is nothing more than old wine being
served in new bottles. Accordingly, Gartzke and Lindsay start their 2019 edited
volume by asking “whether CDD provides any additional analytical traction beyond
classical notions of deterrence…” because “deterrence in practice has always dealt
with …different military services with different nuclear, conventional, and
154Mazarr 2018, p. 5; see also Nye 2017.
155Paul 2018, p. 35.
156De Spiegeleire et al. 2020.
157Snyder 1961, pp. 106–107.
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unconventional weapons, together with various diplomatic, economic, and cultural
instruments of national power.”158 The continuities with traditional deterrence lit-
erature are indeed considerable: traditional concepts of deterrence by punishment
and denial are still part and parcel of the strategic lexicon; the literature keeps
returning to favouring conditions of successful deterrence including the commu-
nication of credible threats of cost imposition which is rooted in robust capabilities
and will. At the same time, there is certainly no stasis in the CDD literature. As
demonstrated in the review offered in this chapter, significant developments can be
found both in terms of practical application and theoretical innovation. This speaks
to the idea that CDD is more than just old wine being served in new bottles.
Overall, our review warrants three main conclusions.
First, authors have spent considerable effort on the practical application of key tenets
of traditional deterrence theory in the context of contemporary strategic challenges.
This has resulted in an assortment of innovative ideas predominantly focused on
practical measures and opportunities to deal with challenges related to attribution, threat
credibility and proportionality, signalling and escalation management.
Second, authors have also come up with a number of theoretical advancements.
In addressing today’s strategic challenges, they have refined and expanded on
traditional concepts of deterrence by stressing that successful deterrence should be
envisaged as a continuous process, by usefully differentiating in deterrence by
denial between tactical and strategic impacts, by adding resilience to the other side
of the denial coin; by incorporating social costs in the deterrence by punishment
equation; and by complementing the traditional dominant focus on negative payoff
structures with attention to the role played by positive incentive structures.
Third, in light of these refinements and expansions of the concept deterrence, the
question is warranted whether this enlightened notion of deterrence is still in fact
about the act of deterring an opponent or whether it in effect constitutes a recon-
ceptualisation of the essence of deterrence by making it about dissuading but also
persuading instead of deterring. After all, this expanded concept of dissuasion
implies a more diverse range of instruments, both military and non-military, which
can be used both as a stick and a carrot, both to compel and to deter, both to
persuade and to dissuade, which brings it back to the broader coercive diplomacy
literature from which it originally emerged.
Our own assessment finally is that dissuasion, rather than being akin to deter-
rence, is more fitting as an overarching concept which encompasses the various
means and ways by which one can dissuade the adversary to abstain from the
action.159 As such it includes both positive inducements and negative threats.
Dissuasion can thus work as an umbrella term for deterrence by denial and pun-
ishment, norms, entanglement, resilience and assurance. Given the salience of the
158Lindsay and Gartzke 2019a, pp. 3–4. They eventually find CDD to be more than just old wine
because it emphasises the importance of means much more than was customary in the traditional
deterrence writings. See Lindsay and Gartzke 2019b, pp. 335–340.
159We would like to thank Stephan De Spiegeleire for his contribution to the development of this
idea and for extended discussions on this topic. See also De Spiegeleire et al. 2020.
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hostilities conducted below the legal thresholds of international law as well as the
inability or reluctance of states to respond to varied intrusion across all domains.
This broader concept of dissuasion may be more appropriate in the context of the
strategic challenges in today’s world.
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